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Exploring the transdisciplinary trajectory of suggestibility 
 
Motzkau, J. F. (2009). Exploring the transdisciplinary trajectory of suggestibility, Subjectivity, Volume 27, 
pp172-194. 
 
 
Abstract 
Traditionally considered a deficiency in will power and rationality, suggestibility has proven a troublesome concept for 
psychology. It was forgotten, rediscovered, denounced, undermined experimentation and recently became the ambiguous 
issue at the centre of concern about child witness’ credibility in sexual abuse cases.  
This paper traces the history of suggestibility to show how it raises the ‘paradox of the psychosocial’.  Drawing on the work 
of Deleuze and Stengers, and on interviews with legal practitioners, this paper demonstrates how suggestibility carries this 
paradox into theory, research and legal practice. It thereby opens up a transdisciplinary perspective, allowing for questions 
of power and knowledge to be asked as performative questions. In the spirit of a process centred ontology for psychology, I 
argue that suggestibility constitutes a ‘rhythm of problematisation’, a folding, offering a subversive insight into dynamics of 
subjectification and application, and offering new perspectives towards issues of children’s credibility and protection. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 “…in the case of a suggestion an idea is aroused in another 
person’s brain which is not examined in regard to its origin but 
is accepted just as though it had arisen spontaneously in that 
brain.” (Freud, S. 1888, quote as: Jahoda, G. 1989, p. 255). 
“’It is only suggestion!’ (…) As if we understood what is being 
condemned!” (Chertok & Stengers 1992, p. xvii). 
 
Initially a key topic for the emerging discipline of psychology, suggestibility has been 
forgotten, rediscovered, trivialised, denounced and discounted. It played a key role for 
asserting the difference between assumed primitive, immature, inferior forms of thinking 
(variously associated with for example women and children), and the superior forces of 
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reasoning attributed to the ‘civilised autonomous subject’ that was to form the prototype of 
man the young discipline was modelled around. On closer inspection we can see that 
throughout it’s history suggestibility has also continued to evade definition and undermine 
experimentation; more recently it triggered epistemological short-circuits when ambiguously 
relating psychological questions of memory, childhood and scientificity, with specific legal 
issues around child witness’ credibility, the disclosure of sexual abuse and the use of 
psychological expertise in courts of law.  
 
This paper will trace the trajectory of suggestibility through history, theory, research and 
practice, in order to explore its efficacy at the intersection of psychology and law. Drawing 
on the work of Stengers (1997, 2000), Foucault (1997) and Deleuze (1969, 2006), I will 
demonstrate how suggestibility, through raising the ‘paradox of the psychosocial’, challenges 
disciplinary power by undermining assumptions about the ‘origin of thought’ and the 
autonomy of the self and agency. It thereby opens up a transdisciplinary mode of inquiry 
that offers new perspectives towards the problem of the application of knowledge, as well as 
that of children as court witnesses. 
 
Transdisciplinarity is not a closely defined concept and the term has been used differently in 
various contexts. My analysis draws on a version of transdisciplinarity similar to the one 
underpinning Chertok & Stengers’ (1992) work, or the one elaborated by Stenner (2007) and 
Stenner & Taylor (2008), who develop it as the necessary ‘mode of thought’ for a process 
oriented approach to Psychosocial Studies. While multi- and interdisciplinarity represent 
different ways of combining positive knowledge from different disciplines, transdisciplinarity 
is “concerned with the space between, across and beyond existing disciplines” (Stenner & 
Taylor, 2008, p. 430). Here, in a broadly Foucaultian spirit, emphasis is placed on critical 
awareness for the mechanisms of knowledge, power and exclusion operating within 
disciplines, and our own and others’ inevitable implication within- and relation to disciplines; 
but at the same time a space is opened up between disciplines that allows to examine the 
limitations of particular ways of knowing and being (attending to the situated and personal as 
well as the abstract dimension). Herein transdisciplinarity carves out a positive space for 
recognising and taking seriously that which escapes disciplinary knowledge. So “…if 
interdisciplinarity were the careful setting up of trade-routes between pre-established 
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disciplines, then transdisciplinarity would be the invention of new spaces of knowledge and 
practice that transform the existing territory by opening it up to the new.” (Stenner & 
Taylor, 2008, p. 431). I will demonstrate how suggestibility escapes disciplinary power and 
situates us at once between disciplines. 
In focussing on the efficacies of suggestibility my analysis resonates with recent work on 
questions of affect, relationality and the body (cf. Despret, 2004; Latour, 2004, Blackman, 
2007, 2008); furthermore it unfolds in the spirit of shaping a process oriented psychosocial 
agenda for psychology (Stenner 2007; Brown & Stenner 2009)1. 
The analysis undertaken here follows from a larger research project titled ‘Cross-Examining 
Suggestibility: Memory, Childhood, Expertise” (Motzkau 2006). The study compared child 
witness practice in England/Wales and Germany, focussing on cases of alleged sexual abuse 
and the impact of psychological expertise in legal practice. Based on a genealogy of 
suggestibility research, the study combined an ethnography of English-Welsh and German 
legal practice with data collected in interviews with legal and psychological practitioners and 
researchers. So the present analysis unfolds on the background of the very concrete 
challenges of child witness practice. Since 1990 legislators in England and Wales have 
continued to make significant changes to legal procedure to ensure access to justice 
particularly for child victims of sexual violence (Wescott, 2006). This effort however, stands 
in stark contrast to the fact that conviction rates for cases of rape and sexual abuse in 
England and Wales have dropped from 32% in 1977 to an all time low of 5.5% in 2002 
(Kelly et al 2005), and 6% in 2005/2006 (Feist et al 2007). With this England and Wales 
(alongside Northern Ireland) continue to register the lowest conviction rates in Europe 
(Kelly et al 2005). The seeming failure of newly improved child witness practice in England 
and Wales to deliver access to justice for victims of child sexual abuse exemplifies one of the 
concrete and pressing issues that drive the theoretical argument developed here. While this 
article cannot cover current concerns of child witness practice in detail (see Motzkau, 2006, 
2007, 2009, in press), some of these practice issues will inevitably be foregrounded as the 
analysis unfolds. 
 
1 Situating the problem: the paradox of the psychosocial 
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Since suggestibility first featured as a  distinct topic in the nascent discipline of psychology 
during the late 19th century it inspired a paradox. On the one hand being suggestible was 
considered an expression of manipulability and irrationality. William McDougall, like many 
of his contemporaries, defined that “Suggestion is a process of communication resulting in 
the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically 
adequate grounds for its acceptance.” (McDougall, 1911, p. 97). On the other hand, and in 
stark contrast to such assertions of irrationality, the ability to be suggestible was considered the 
most fundamental characteristic of the human mind accounting for the possibility of 
learning, affection and social cohesion, in short the sine qua non of human existence 
(Baudoin 1921; Sidis & James, 1919). Interestingly, McDougall also embraced this positive 
aspect of suggestibility, attributing children’s ability to “absorb knowledge, beliefs, and 
especially the sentiments of their social environment” to the “virtue largely of their 
suggestibility” (McDougall, 1911, p. 100). How could suggestibility be a personal deficit of 
reasoning as well as the ‘vital force’ of human existence?  
I term this paradox emerging around suggestibility the ‘paradox of the psychosocial’, because 
it captures and expresses the essence of what was to become the lasting dilemma of 
understanding the relation between the psychological and the social at a time when their split 
into separate entities was only just occurring. 
Stenner & Taylor (2008) describe the broader disciplinary dimension of such developments, 
noting that in the late 19th century the social and the psychological sciences faced a 
‘grounding paradox’, because they “came into being as a result of this relation between 
‘society’ and ‘subject’” (Stenner & Taylor, 2008, p. 418) but by functionally specialising each 
on just one side of this relation, they served to obscure this relation, ultimately thinking the 
psychic and the social in separation. 
Blackman (2008) captures such paradox developments as the riddle of “what makes us both 
‘one and many’” (Blackman, 2008, p. 24), that occupied much of the theorising about 
individuation and social unity in the late 19th century. In this context Blackman (2007) 
highlights the crucial, yet long neglected contribution of Gabriel Tarde. Tarde (1903) 
embraced the paradox emerging around suggestibility by underlining the importance of 
imitation, and thus suggestibility, as a dynamic constituent of the self as the social. Yet, 
Blackman elaborates, at the time Tarde’s work was co-opted and impoverished, because the 
idea of suggestion as an ontology of the social implied a possibility of limitless personal 
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change and interrelation that sat uncomfortably with the existing hierarchical social order 
and the ideal of the autonomous individual. Contemporaries of Tarde, such as Ross (1909) 
and McDougall (1911) ultimately resolved the paradox by clearly characterising the effects of 
suggestion as mindless imitation, which meant that openness to social influence, 
suggestibility, became identifiable as a feature of inferior, primitive, immature reasoning and 
lack of will power. This helped assert the autonomous, rationally thinking man as the 
prototype against which for example women, children, the working classes or colonial 
subjects could be disqualified as having inferior, primitive reasoning powers, thus warranting 
the need to guide and control them, and justifying their exclusion from certain political and 
legal practices (Blackman 2007). We will see at what cost the dominant discourse of 
developmental psychology (to some extent still) perpetuates assumptions of children’s 
immature reasoning and thus diminished credibility. 
 
Taking an even closer look at the paradox of the psychosocial as it emerges around 
suggestibility, I would argue that suggestibility ambiguously raises two inseparable questions. 
Firstly, resonating with Blackman’s (2007) point, suggestibility raises the question of self-
other relationality, i.e. ‘how can we relate while also being separate’? Secondly, it also raises 
the question of the characteristics of knowledge/knowing, and thus draws attention to the 
practices of reason operating at once in personal and disciplinary scientific contexts, i.e. how 
do we ‘know’, how can we trust our knowledge, or indeed memory, while continuously 
having to express and perform this knowing and thus re-assessing its origin and value in 
relation to ourselves and others? Herein suggestibility, via the paradox of the psychosocial, 
collapses the ‘personal’ into the ‘scientific’, undermining the constitutive division of scientific 
self and thought. Following the historic developments, we could see that this paradox, which 
enables the subject yet appears to confound it with its social environment, is effectively 
buried beneath assumptions and performances of individual psychological autonomy. I argue 
however, that as such the question of suggestibility has never been successfully contained or 
eliminated. Suggestibility summons circumstances in which the paradox is let loose and 
directly communicates itself to (scientific) reasoning, pitching the reasoning forces of the 
discipline against themselves. I will demonstrate how suggestibility carries the ‘paradox of 
the psychosocial’ into the ordering disciplinary structures of psychological and legal theory 
and practice, challenging their disciplinary power.  
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Deleuze’s concept of the 'fold' (Deleuze, 1986) has a strong resonance with the paradox of 
the psychosocial, allowing that subject and environment are never fully separated and, 
further, that the self to self relationship, often thought to underpin memory, psychological 
continuity and responsibility for self, retains simultaneous connections to the extra-psychic 
even as it is used to define pure interiority. I will show how the theoretical figure of the 
‘fold’, capturing the demarcations of self and thought as a movement, as a process of 
subjectification, resonates closely with the way suggestibility problematises disciplinary 
practices. In this sense suggestibility constitutes what can be called a ‘rhythm of 
problematisation’, offering a subversive insight into the paradox processes of application, 
agency and subjectification. 
 
In the following I will trace the transdisciplinary trajectory of suggestibility via three 
interrelated perspectives, in order to explore an exemplary series of the paradoxes or voids 
the notion, phenomenon, concept of suggestibility triggers and creates throughout history, 
theory, research and practice.  
Firstly, I will trace the discontinuous research history of suggestibility as it is forgotten and 
re-remembered, defies definition and re-merges as part of the history of child sexual abuse. 
Secondly, examining the efficacy of suggestibility we will see how it spills over the 
experimental framework, ultimately feeding back into public perception and legal practice 
with uncontrollable effects. Thirdly, drawing on data from an interview with an English 
criminal court judge, I will trace suggestibility into the concrete dynamics of legal practice, to 
examine what it means to apply knowledge about suggestibility.  
 
2. Suggestibility defies definition and merges with the history of child sexual abuse 
 
Specific interest in suggestibility emerged during the late 19th century and suggestibility soon 
enjoyed “an enormous vogue” (Jahoda, 1989 p. 255) within the wider arena of the social 
sciences, where it was drawn on to explain the most diverse social phenomena, such as 
crime, war or religion, the nature of mobs, or the success of charismatic leaders (Le Bon 
1895; McDougall, 1911; James, 1890; Tarde 1903; Sidis & James, 1919). Scientists now seen 
as the founding figures of psychology, such as Wundt (1892), Binet (1900) or Freud (1919), 
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also regarded suggestibility, alongside memory, as one of the central topics for the emerging 
discipline.   
Within the clinical field however, the fascination with suggestibility was accompanied by 
persistent problems defining the phenomenon under investigation. H. Bernheim (1887) took 
it to be a normal psychological phenomenon that could be used in therapy to achieve 
curative effects, while the Parisian neurologist Charcot (1887) insisted suggestibility, just as 
other hypnotic phenomena, was a sign of psychopathology, namely hysteria. Famously, 
suggestibility played a central and ambiguous role for Freud, who had initially endorsed 
Bernheim’s approach and used suggestion within his new ‘talking cure’. Yet Freud soon 
reversed his position towards suggestion. In the context of recanting his seduction theory in 
1897, only a year after its publication in the “Aetiology of Hysteria” (Freud, 1896), he 
declared that he had erroneously taken for true his patients’ reports of early childhood sexual 
victimisation (and considered this trauma a cause of hysteria), and that these were more 
likely to have been the result of fantasies or suggestion (Masson 1984). Freud abandoned 
suggestion as a therapeutic technique, because he could not control its impact; suggestion 
was ‘impure’, it put the possibility of a truth about experiences, the truth of memory, in 
question. Simultaneously Freud observed that suggestion dangerously blurred the boundary 
between therapist and patient, leading to potentially uncontrollable affective transferences 
onto the therapist (Chertok & Stengers 1992). He sought to exclude suggestion because 
ultimately it obscured the kind of rational analytic insight that was going to become 
paramount for the psychoanalytic technique Freud aimed to develop (Freud, 1919). Chertok 
& Stengers (1992) highlight how in application though Freud could never quite prove that he 
was able to rule out or control suggestion. It continued to re-emerge within therapeutic 
practice as a doubt undermining the scientific rationale of his technique. It is in this sense 
that suggestibility, raising the paradox of the psychosocial, challenges the possibility of 
ascertaining the truth of memory and experience, and the possibility of a strictly scientific 
(controlled) relation yet division between therapist and client.   
From an experimental psychological perspective serious concerns about definitions, and 
about the operationalisability of suggestibility, were voiced early on by Binet (1900) and 
Stern (1904). Interestingly however, this work of Binet and Stern was largely ignored and 
remained so until very recently. At the time experimental work in the field gained pace 
regardless and central figures such as Hull (1933) and Eysenck (1945), sought to promote 
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what they considered strictly scientific approaches to suggestibility. Hull was particularly 
keen to counteract what he considered the disquieting influence of psychoanalysis, and 
aimed to de-mystify suggestibility by demonstrating that it was accessible to strictly scientific 
experimental methods. His experiments yielded plentiful but ambiguous results and Hull had 
to concede that the phenomenon remained evasive, with difficulties being so great that he 
warned that “to enter seriously on a program of investigation in this field is a little like 
tempting fate; it is almost to court scientific disaster. Small wonder that orthodox scientists 
have usually avoided the subject!” (Hull, 1933, p. 403). 
In a similar vein Eysenck (1945) describes fundamental problems in devising clear cut 
concepts for the phenomena he observed. He finally he concluded that suggestibility does 
not exist at all, or that there may be many different, uncorrelated, types of suggestibility 
(Eysenck 1991). Such conceptual multiplication suggests that there could ultimately be as 
many suggestibilities as there are instants of suggesting, implying what could be termed a 
form of ‘process epistemology’ (i.e. every single occurrence would then constitute a concept, 
meaning the rules for establishing knowledge, epistemology, are continuously constituted, 
they are essentially process). Deleuze (1968) might call such a dynamic an individuation or an 
event. While this is probably not what Eysenck had in mind, within the experimental field 
there is evidence of the efficacy of such conceptual multiplications, underlining the 
ambiguity suggestibility injects into the relationship between concepts and phenomena. In 
various ways suggestibility was considered to be related to such diverse concepts as hypnosis, 
imitation, social contagion, conformity, compliance, decision making, imagination, changes 
in attitude, bias, expectancy, self-fulfilling prophecy, placebo, dissociation, coping and 
defence, to name just a few. Within the field this was, and is, perceived as a serious problem, 
and experimental psychologists have only recently called for more ‘logical hygiene’ 
(Gheorghiu, 2000) around suggestibility, after finding themselves in the peculiar situation 
where the number of theoretical concepts to explain suggestibility (often contradicting each 
other), by far exceeded the number of observable phenomena (Gheorghiu, 1989).  
 
Here I can only offer a broad sketch of suggestibiliy’s early trajectory. Still, the varied 
declarations of defiance issued by the researchers, underline how suggestibility challenges the 
conceptual and scientific self-confidence of early clinical and experimental psychology(ists). 
While other phenomena and concepts, such as those around memory, are continuously and 
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successfully re-aligned with newly emerging sub-disciplines and paradigm-shifts (Schacter 
1995), suggestibility, despite attracting much attention, seems too unwieldy for such co-
option, proving an almost paradoxical obsession. 
(…) suggestion has become a kind of obsession for the experimental psychologist as well as for the Freudian 
therapist: for both suggestion puts the ‘truth’ in question, that is, it problematises the possibility of constructing 
a theory on the basis of experiment or experience. Suggestion is impure; it is the uncontrollable par excellence.” 
(Chertok & Stengers 1992, p. xvii). 
It is then not surprising maybe that suggestibility vanished from the research agendas 
towards the middle of the 20th century. While memory was established as one of the central 
topics for psychology, specific interest in suggestibility waned and between the 1950s and the 
mid 1970’s there was hardly any research at all.  
 
Looking at the trajectory so far it is clear that the challenge of suggestibility is directed at the 
underlying assumption of a rational autonomous and independently thinking and acting 
subject, a concept that initially informed the agenda of both the psychoanalytic and the 
experimental project as they emerged around the later 19th century. Suggestibility turns 
research into vivid demonstrations of participant’s and researchers’ lack of control over the 
phenomena and concepts they summon; it disputes the subject’s autonomy and boundaries, 
illustrating researchers’ and participants’ multiple inter-relatedness and permeability to the 
effects of their own research. The following will offer more detailed examples for this 
dynamic.  
 
In the mid 1970s phenomena related to suggestibility played a role in ongoing memory 
research (Loftus, 1980). Yet, suggestibility as a central research topic only fully re-emerged in 
the mid 1980’s when due to a growing awareness for sexual violence against women and 
children in many northern American and European countries, legal changes resulted in a 
growing number of children being admitted as court witnesses in child abuse cases (Haaken, 
1998). During the 1980s courts in Northern America and parts of Europe (e.g. England and 
Germany) saw a number of high profile miscarriages of justice in child abuse cases that 
hinged on evidence given by children, who, as proven in some cases, had been questioned in 
a highly suggestive manner by overzealous investigators and/or parents (Ceci & Bruck, 1995; 
Bell, 1988; Bull, 1998; Steller, 2000; Lee, 1999). These cases sparked an intense research 
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interest in children’s suggestibility. This heightened concern about children’s reliability as 
witnesses, now framed as the fear of their suggestibility, echoes a long standing generalised 
wariness about children’s memory and their ability to serve as court witnesses, that had in 
many jurisdictions virtually excluded them from giving evidence for centuries (Motzkau 
2006; Spencer & Flin 2001). 
When suggestibility re-emerged in the mid 80s there was little reference to earlier research 
and conceptual and definitional problems were not addressed systematically. As a result of 
the forensic practice impetus, modern suggestibility research featured exclusively as a very 
circumscribed area of forensic experimental child psychology, taking its phenomenological 
cues and the inspiration for experimental set ups directly from problems encountered in legal 
practice. This meant that vague operational definitions prevailed in this field, so inclusive 
they explicitly attribute suggestibility to the paradoxical space between the psychological and 
the social. “...[suggestibility (JFM)] concerns the degree to which children’s encoding, 
storage, retrieval, and reporting of events can be influenced by a range of social and 
psychological factors.” (Ceci & Bruck, 1993, p. 404). 
Echoing suggestibility’s earlier association with ‘immature reasoning’, this focus on children 
produced the impression that suggestibility was largely a problem concerning children; a 
conclusion that resonated with already existing assumptions about their developmentally 
deficient reasoning (Walkerdine, 1988). Further, based on the predominant research focus, 
the phenomenon of suggestibility now appeared to be almost synonymous with the problem 
of children falsely reporting events (e.g. sexual abuse) that had not happened. This highlights 
an interesting omission: the equally plausible reverse case, i.e. sexually abused children being 
coached (e.g. by the abuser) into reporting (or even believing) they had not been abused, 
hardly featured in research until fairly recently (Lyon & Saywitz, 2006; Pope, 1996).  
 
While around 1900 research had considered suggestibility to be related to a multitude of 
phenomena, it re-emerged as a very narrowly framed topic that was now tied into the 
complex societal issue of sexual abuse. Reminiscent of Freud’s ill-fated encounter with 
patients’ reports of sexual abuse, the history of suggestibility now merged directly with the 
history of child sexual abuse. Hereby the history of suggestibility also became an explicit part 
of the gendered history of psychology with its implicit marginalisation of women and 
children (Burman, 1997; Walkerdine, 1988; Motzkau 2009, in press). 
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By explicitly occupying the intersection of psychology and law issues surrounding 
suggestibility gained very public ‘real life’ relevance. This put an added spin on the efficacy of 
suggestibility as an ‘itinerant scientific disaster’, as I will illustrate in the next section.  
 
3. Suggestibility spills over the experimental framework with uncontrollable effects 
“Isn’t it absurd that, with respect to suggestion, which has always been the symptom that 
we are perhaps not in control of ourselves, we have remained at the level of judgements 
whose Manichaean naivité returns us to the era of witch-hunts?” (Stengers, 1997, p. 106).  
Even though experimental research in this area was generally helpful in alerting practitioners 
to the necessity of unbiased and careful interviewing, and by demonstrating that children can 
be good witnesses, modern suggestibility research had unwittingly inherited the perpetual 
lack of clarity about the phenomenon under investigation. It is then not surprising to find 
that this research was riddled with ambiguity. 
A study by Erdmann (2001) provides a good example for the ambiguity emerging around 
suggestibility. Taking its cue directly from the high profile miscarriages of justice, this study 
aimed to examine whether it was possible to implant entirely fictitious memories, ‘false 
events’, into children by repeatedly interviewing them about such false events in a suggestive 
manner. 67 primary school children were submitted to 4 interviews, each time prompting 
them to report four specific events from their past. Two of the prompts referred to true 
events, but the other two prompts hinted at ‘false events’ that had been invented specifically 
by researchers and parents for each child.  
While successfully demonstrating that in a final fifth interview an impressive 58% of the 
children delivered detailed accounts of false events, the experiment also produced a peculiar 
side effect: With some children the narratives of false events had grown so detailed, that the 
researchers suspected the ‘false memory’ cues might have elicited true memories of real 
events. To clarify the researchers sought confirmation from the parents. Remarkably, even 
though parents had initially assisted inventing these ‘false events’, when confronted with 
their children’s narratives some parents now said they also remembered the events, and 
others were unable to disconfirm, leaving the matter unresolved. Either these narratives did 
refer to true memories (possibly ‘recovered’), or the accounts of ‘false memories’ had been 
enriched with an unknown amount of details from real events, or, after all, parents and 
 12 
researchers had fallen suggestible to the result of their own suggestions, now believing that 
the ‘false events’, they had implanted, truly were memories of real events.  
Here suggestibility undermines the logic of experimentation by spilling over into the meta-
framework of the experimental set up. It travels beyond the experimental setting and directly 
into the relations between children, parents and researchers. The experiment itself becomes 
suggestive, and rather than controlling it, researchers are transformed into unwilling 
protagonists of the set up they engineered. 
Suggestibility summons the paradox of the psychosocial within the setting, explicitly playing 
out the impasse of the ‘subject’ and of ‘knowledge’: how can those involved be separate, yet 
relate; who initiates or controls the direction and meaning this relationship takes on, and 
who holds the key to ascertaining the truth or falsehood of memory and how can this truth 
be anchored within these relationships? In this case the hierarchical organisation of roles and 
the clear separation of subjects that the experimental set up relies on, has broken down. 
Rather than ‘subjects’ or ‘agents’ in an experimental setting,  we can see multidirectional 
dynamics of relating, flows of affecting, while the external truth criteria, carefully laid down 
by the experimenters, have collapsed into an ambiguous multi-referential dynamic. Clearly, 
the experiment cannot control the forces, the phenomena, it has summoned. Interestingly 
this communicates itself to the researchers who cannot completely ignore the side-effects 
that have afflicted the experiment.  
Understood in this way the experiment reveals less about the possibility of ‘suggesting false 
memories’, and more but about the power relations and practices of reason that form the 
basis of experimental procedures. I would argue that it is in this sense that suggestibility 
plays out, folds, the constitutive force of experimental practice against itself and its authors: 
experimental practice encounters its own limits as being manifest within its own constitutive 
rules. It affects and implies researchers personally by touching on, and highlighting the 
relevance of their own (and their participants’) lived personal experiences, memories and 
relationships.  
 
Suggestibility research now relates directly to legal practice, so the effects triggered by this 
research can have even wider implications, feeding back into public perception and legal 
practice with uncontrollable effects.  
 13 
Stephen Ceci’s work provides an interesting example for the way suggestibility spills over 
into public opinion and legal practice. Ceci (Ceci et al 1994) conducted an experiment very 
similar to the one described above, investigating the impact of neutral but repetitive 
questioning by repeatedly asking children whether or not they had experienced four specific 
events (again, two false and two true events). The experiment not only successfully 
demonstrated that children would, in a final interview, assent to having experienced 34% of 
the fictitious events, but there was a side-effect again. 27% of the children assenting to false 
events, persistently clung to their assent after being de-briefed, and could not even be 
dissuaded by their parents. As a result of this unexpected outcome, Ceci et al (1994) claimed 
they had, for the first time, managed to show that it was possible to implant false memories 
into children. The study sparked huge public and media interest, and formed the centre of a 
heated international debate. 
Within his field Ceci was attacked on ethical grounds, for what the critics considered a 
violation of children’s right to form their ‘own memory’ (Herrman & Yoder, 1998). Other 
researchers highlighted methodological and experimental inaccuracies, pointing to 
unfounded or vastly overstated results and incomplete statistics (Erdmann, 2001). Goodman 
et al (1998) directly rejected Ceci’s claim, pointing out that children may just have assented, 
played along with the task, or tried to save face (see also Ceci, 1998). Crucially, Goodman et 
al (1998) highlighted that much of the more public debate was based on superficially 
reported experiments, third hand references and scandalised media reports. This is a 
pertinent point because the debate and its media coverage fuelled a simplistic understanding 
of suggestibility research in the public, fostering an exaggerated fear of children’s 
vulnerability to suggestion. This fear was seen to filter directly into legal practice and 
decision-making, reinstating a general atmosphere of disbelief in children’s testimony 
(Greuel, 2001, Goodman et al 1998). This atmosphere is also thought to have discouraged 
children and parents from reporting abuse, and to dispose jury members against child 
witnesses (ibid.). Similar net-effects could be seen in several European countries (Motzkau, 
2005). In England and Wales for example, the judicial studies board adopted a film about 
Ceci’s implanted memory research for judges’ training (Westcott, 1998). Academics in the 
field harshly criticised this measure, pointing out that the film provided an unfounded and 
biased demonstration of the unreliability of children’s evidence, giving the impression their 
accounts of abuse were often false (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2002). 
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Once more we can see an experiment summoning phenomena it cannot control. Here 
suggestibility does not just spill over into the experimental meta-framework, but having 
migrated into the legal context it becomes a very public matter, spreading into the 
interdisciplinary and international context with tangible effects for specific real life court 
cases. Here the unease of finding they had become very personally entangled in the problem 
they were trying to solve, motivates some researchers in this field to enter into the flurry of 
public self-positionings, self-reflection, sometimes even playing down own and others’ 
research results, as exemplified by Goodman et al’s (1998) response. 
We could say that suggestibility has created circumstances under which researchers in this 
field cannot ignore that research has turned from an abstract conceptual, into a very 
personal, legal as well as public matter. This is particularly true when considering that 
researchers are often directly reabsorbed into the adversarial dynamic of the legal context, 
either as experts in court, or when serving as an authority to bolster or discredit a certain 
claim. Here the credibility and authority of the discipline, and that of the expert, to make 
their claims matter to a specific case, are exposed to the scrutiny of the adversarial practices 
of reason and evidence operating in the courtroom. This at once turns an abstract question 
of scientific practice, into a very personal dilemma for those concerned, as Ceci seems to 
acknowledge. “What it [suggestibility research (JFM)] suggests is that the biases of 
researchers rather than the credibility of children should be investigated.” (Ceci et al 1993, p. 
133). 
Ceci is unlikely to have intended this connotation, but his remark implies that the ones 
examining the phenomenon are themselves subject to it. They are themselves in permanent 
danger of being afflicted by a lack of ‘rational’ judgement, they are ‘not in control of 
themselves’ as Stengers (1997) puts it, and easily swayed by the societal dynamics 
surrounding them. Understood in this way suggestibility itself is suggestive; it has come full 
circle, folding the disciplinary power of experimental psychology against itself, as researchers 
have to problematise their own personal practice as a result of being drawn into the wider 
societal dynamics produced by the efficacy of their work. Suggestibility inserts researchers 
into the ambiguous space between disciplines, beyond disciplinary power, and exposes them 
to the multiple layers of reality at work there. And again we can see how the efficacy of 
suggestibility folds the ‘personal’ into the ‘scientific’ it folds the abstract rules of scientific 
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examination into the lived experience of those involved, problematising the way these two 
dimensions matter to one another.  
 
4. The rhythm of problematisation 
While tracing this series of paradoxes through history, theory and practice, it has become 
clear that the paradoxes and the resulting voids opened up by suggestibility are transient but 
recurring phenomena; they are part of an ongoing process. The paradox of the psychosocial 
expresses itself via the specific operations of researchers and practitioners as and when they 
have to negotiate and operate with suggestibility in the context of their specific practice (e.g. 
research or legal). This is why suggestibility has not ‘overthrown’ modern suggestibility 
research as such or made legal decisions ‘impossible’. Courts do adjudicate and modern 
suggestibility research continues to thrive in its own particular way. Hence re-considering the 
trajectory as the dynamic result of an ongoing process, we could say that suggestibility 
initiates a ‘rhythm of problematisation’, a recurring series of paradoxes that form a transient, 
yet recurring pattern of problematisation within and through practice (research and legal), as 
it is performed (or occurs). This ‘rhythm of problematisation’ communicates itself to 
practitioners as an inevitable, yet perplexing, feature of application. But then, what exactly is 
application? 
 
For applied experimental psychology, application usually means, firstly, for the effects 
produced in studies to be extrapolated to comment on the intended real-world phenomenon 
(here, children’s propensity to succumb to the suggestion they had been sexually abused) 
and, secondly, for this to systematically inform case decisions in legal practice. Yet, we could 
see that research struggles to get a firm grasp of either of these two aspects; neither the 
‘effects produced in studies’ nor the ‘intended real life phenomena’ are particularly clear cut. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to say who is the ‘agent’ of these ‘applications’. Looking at the 
trajectory of suggestibility it seems suggestibility is prone to ‘extrapolating itself’, it ‘applies 
itself’ producing its very own critical commentary on practices and their real life effects.  
Understood in this way application is not such a straightforward matter. On the background 
of this analysis we have to suspect that practitioners themselves become unwilling 
transdisciplinary operators at nodes of complexity, because they are forced to simultaneously 
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relate to, handle, negotiate and apply the ambiguous and shifting knowledge about 
suggestibility and thus children’s credibility to- and within practice (Motzkau, 2006).  
So what happens at the moment of application? How and at what cost does legal practice 
give children access to justice while having to systematically distrust their ability to satisfy the 
‘legal call to truth’?  
 
5. The paradox of application: 
Judge2:  there’s a great distrust of experts ((yea)) HA! HA! (laughing) y’know 
PSYCHOLOGISTS! (humorous contempt) an’ there is I then there you know 
and we only need Ceci’s lecture I mean then in a way to make you 
undermine your own faith in your own judgement (1) but you know we 
tend to think as well a’ oh no well you know show me ahh later I’ll I’ll sort 
it out […]2 
Over the past two decades the English-Welsh legal system has answered the challenge of 
suggestibility and child protection by introducing special measures for child witnesses, e.g. 
children can give evidence via CCTV-link (Home Office, 1999), but also by educating legal 
practitioners about interviewing techniques and suggestibility, e.g. the controversial decision 
to use a film about Ceci’s research to educate judges (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2002).  
The short interview excerpt quoted above illustrates the reaction of an English criminal 
court judge when asked generally about the role of psychological experts and expertise in 
court. Initially reflecting the general distrust against scientific expertise that is characteristic 
for English legal tradition, he directly moves on to comment on Ceci’s film (‘lecture’) as an 
example for the uncertainty this knowledge carries, by undermining “your own faith in your 
own judgement”. Yet, he enigmatically concludes, show me a case and “I’ll ‘sort it out”. In 
the interview the judge illustrates this uncertainty by describing a clip from the film that 
showed a witness, a young girl, being interviewed suggestively by a police officer. The judge 
reports to have concluded her account was false, a result of suggestion, only to be proven 
wrong by the film, which later shows the accused, her father, who has confessed, confirming 
everything the girl said. How can this case, and thereby Ceci’s research, relate to the judge’s 
practice and decisions? Even though this clip seems to tell a very specific story about the fact 
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that even an unconvincing child witness, exposed to suggestion, could be telling the truth, it 
simultaneously carries the double-edgedness that is so characteristic for the paradox of the 
psychosocial introduced by suggestibility. While generally alerting us to the fact that 
suggestion exists, in relation to the concrete case, this research also implies the opposite 
message: indicators of suggestion may coincide with a true statement. So clearly, application 
cannot be based on an abstract movement of extrapolation from research or even from 
other case examples. Application seems to operate on the basis of entirely different 
parameters. Strictly speaking scientific findings (as presented by Ceci) cannot be ‘applied’, 
they have no abstract way of their own to relate to the concrete. Application operates on the 
principle, or the practice epistemology, of “I’ll sort it out”, to use the judge’s own words. 
Whatever this means in any given moment, it is this personal work, this specific operation of 
‘sorting it out’, that constitutes application, and that in this sense entertains an inherently 
paradoxical relationship towards the research or expert knowledge that is supposed to 
inform it. But what exactly constitutes this ‘paradox personal operation’?  
In English-Welsh criminal courts it is the jury and not judges who will decide about the 
credibility of a witness. Yet, as it is impossible to gain direct access to a jury’s movements of 
application, the judge’s considerations offer the most specific insight available. The following 
excerpt illustrates the dynamics at work within the paradox of application in more detail. 
During the same interview this judge explains that he is advised, where child witnesses are 
concerned, to give a special direction to the jury, warning them to take particular care with 
the evidence of a young child.  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Judge2: […] but I think that’s quite a difficult one when you have to when you say (.) and I will 
sometimes say it depends how it feels LOOK this case depends on the evidence of a nine 
year old boy now you you know you all know children ahhhm nine year olds can lie nine 
year olds can tell the truth but this this was a nine year old you are dealing with here 
((hmhm)) ahhhm but wh’ wha’ what that actually says I’m never quite su:hu:re (chuckling 
through ‘sure’)3  
 
Looking only at the information conveyed in this direction (lines 2-4), we would have to 
agree with the judge’s perplexed amusement as he delivers this self-confessed tautology 
adding he was never quite sure what it actually said (5). But if this direction is ‘self-annulling’, 
why would the judge present it as a “difficult one” (1)?  
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The way the ‘expert knowledge’ (about children) turns paradoxical when related directly to a 
case illustrates the paradox of application. The knowledge cannot operate directly upon the 
case, it turns paradoxical, implying that judge and jury, as nodes of these practice operations, 
have to perform or facilitate specific transformations to make it work, to fill the void it 
presents. This inherent volatility, this openness and need for concrete transformation, 
exposes a potential point of change within this practice. At the specific moment the multiple 
implications, signs and issues carried along by the entangled histories of suggestibility and 
child sexual abuse, are all summoned at once, opening up multiple paths, lines of flight 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1980). Here the disciplinary power of psychology and the dominant 
discourses about childhood and credibility are just as prominent as the problematising 
ambiguity introduced by suggestibility, that seems to communicate itself to the judge as he 
laughs about the paradoxicality of his direction. 
With a critical eye on the dominant discourses around childhood and suggestibility, we can 
see that this purportedly ‘neutral’ direction is likely to undermine children’s voice in court. 
What the judge summons for the jury, by reminding them to draw on their ‘common sense’ 
knowledge about children (“you all know children” 3), is the longstanding wariness about 
children’s credibility as such. As pointed out earlier, this wariness is perpetuated by the 
implications of the dominant discourse of developmental psychology (for detailed discussion 
see Motzkau 2009; Burman, 2007; Morss, 1996). Following this implication a jury is likely to 
make perfect sense of this direction. They fill the gap opened by the paradox with implicit 
assumptions about children’s immature and thus inferior memory and reasoning, thus 
concluding that their evidence is unreliable. Clearly, we can only speculate about the impact 
of the direction in this specific case, but conviction rates and anecdotal evidence by legal 
practitioners confirm that juries are often reluctant to convict on the evidence of children 
(Motzkau, 2006; Westcott, 2006).  
In contrast to this, looking directly at the judge’s utterance as a reflection of the way he 
‘applies’ the direction, we can see the subversive, problematising side to the paradox of 
application as it unfolds. The way the judge presents the paradox and then laughs it away, 
saying he was never quite sure what it meant (5), opens an instant void in the ordering 
structure of both, psychological knowledge and legal structure. What is expressed here, and 
what possibly expresses itself to the judge as he gives this direction, is the fact that the 
instructive, representative power of psychological expertise (here about children’s 
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credibility), as well as that of the law, are utterly irrelevant for what is at stake at this moment 
in this case. At this moment it is abundantly clear that the age of this particular boy will not 
tell us whether he is lying or not, or whether he has been coached. In this concrete moment 
of application the directive disciplinary power of psychology, as well as that of the law, have 
lost their dominance, they are suspended, paradox, or at best hilarious. What is allowed to 
matter, at this specific moment, is the volatility, the void itself, summoning an abundance of 
conflicting implications and signs void of direction; an excess of meaning about true and 
false memories, childhood, suggestibility and sexual abuse; as if a condensed history of 
suggestibility emerged at once in this moment. These are the signs or meanings the judge has 
to inhabit abstractly as he makes this utterance. Yet, this does not imply that (or how) he is 
personally aware of this. At this point in the analysis, considering the micro-dynamics of 
application, he features not so much a separate person or an agent, but he becomes visible as 
part of a dynamic process of inter-relating; he is realised as the singular point, a node, 
through which the multiple abstract yet specific signs relate to this specific event (the case) at 
this moment. As such he dissolves into the context while also constituting the transient yet 
dynamic limits of this process (a folding), because this occurrence is inherently defined, or 
framed, through his utterance. In this way the dynamic illustrates what Deleuze describes as 
the process of subjectification. 
“A process of subjectification, that is, the production of a way of existing, can’t be equated with a subject, 
unless we divest the subject of any interiority and even any identity. Subjectification isn’t even anything to do 
with a ‘person’: it’s a specific or collective individuation relating to an event (a time of day, a river, a wind, a 
life…). It’s a mode of intensity, not a personal subject. It’s a specific dimension without which we can’t go 
beyond knowledge or resist power.” (Deleuze, G. 1990 [1995] p. 99). 
 
Subjectification is the process of folding as a movement of simultaneous inclusion-exclusion. 
It is a movement tracing a limit, “For what the fold presents as a limit on the sheet as pure 
outside is, in its being, a movement of the sheet itself” (Badiou, 2000, p. 89), thus pure 
interiority, and as such expressing an ‘ontic process’.  
In the light of the challenge posed by suggestibility we can see that neither self (nor 
‘subject’), nor knowledge can be grasped as a state, or stable entity; they are fundamentally 
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emergent from the dynamic self-reference of forces, constituted through a continuous 
process of relating, and as such the discernible matter of a ‘process ontology’. 
 
This does not mean we have ‘done away’ with the ‘person’. Moving out of this dimension of 
the micro-analysis of application, we can see an element of personal experience resonating 
within this occurrence. Given the judge’s laughter, we may speculate that his repeated 
exposure to the discrepancy between the myriad of different details and issues arising in each 
of the many cases he has seen, and the ever same direction he gives for all of those cases, 
alerts him to this void (in a way a jury is unlikely to perceive, because jury members will 
rarely experience more than one such case). So for him experiencing the void may constitute 
an integral accumulating doubt, and potentially the strange sense of what we could call an 
‘experienced individuation’. 
 
6. Concluding the transdisciplinary trajectory of suggestibility: matters of ap-pli-
cation 
“…we think the challenge of the ‘false witnesses’ of hypnosis 
and suggestion could be met by the practice of a 
‘transdisciplinary’ research identifying its participants as 
perplexed authors and not as representatives of their respective 
disciplines’ authority.” (Chertok & Stengers 1992, p. 277). 
 
Despite having been set up as the constitutive ‘other’ of the dominant model of the ‘rational 
subject’, suggestibility has persistently operated as a search engine for epistemological 
problems, opening up a transdisciplinary perspective. Suggestibility escapes disciplinary 
power and situates us at once between disciplines, forcing us to attend to the shifts, 
movements and the multiply interlaced realities exposed where the limitations of particular 
(disciplinary) ways of knowing are expressed and experienced. It thereby presents researchers 
and practitioners as ‘perplexed authors’ and ‘uncertain operators’ of the phenomena they 
summon. Yet, it also communicates itself to those ‘perplexed authors’, by tracing the 
epistemological problems into the very concrete fabric of application. Suggestibility initiates 
a rhythm of problematisation, a groove of ‘untimely’ dynamics continually invoking 
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something that is outside of the disciplinary discourses of science as well as history, an anti-
memory (Deleuze, 1990). 
Clearly, the movement of application itself constitutes a problematising, disruptive element, 
as it continually exposes the volatility of the dominant concepts and disciplines that guide 
practice. It is a form of ‘folding’, a playing out of force against force that opens up the void 
within which an excess of abstract-concrete signs and issues can come to matter. In this 
sense application should be conceptualised as a matter of ‘ap-pli-cation’; as the generative 
activity of folding (pli), the movement, or dynamic of ‘making matter’ (in both senses) while 
relaying knowledge into practice (Foucault, 1977); thereby dissolving the subject/agent and 
making them part of a process within which multiple, dominant and previously excluded 
issues can come to matter (Stengers, 2008).  
“Crossing the line of force, going beyond power, involves as it were bending force, making it impinge on itself 
rather than on other forces: a ‘fold’, in Foucault’s terms, force playing on itself. It’s a question of the doubling 
of the play of forces, of a self relation that allows us to resist, to elude power, to turn life and death against 
power.” (Deleuze, G. 1990 [1995] p. 98). 
 Yet again, this being a movement, the problematising effect is always transient, and the 
direction of ‘mattering’ always open for potential recuperation. For example the judge might 
well move on and gloss over what could post-hoc be seen as uncertainty or even 
unprofessional conduct. Crucially however, the instances exemplified here recur; they can be 
observed across child witness practice, as the incisions marking the transdisciplinary 
trajectory of suggestibility.  
We need to examine these incisions in more detail by exploring the micro-dynamics of ap-
pli-cation within practices, in order to systematically grasp the generative and critical 
potential emergent where the dynamic of ‘ap-pli-cation’ constitutes a subjectification. This 
could on the one hand form part of an agenda for a ‘process oriented’ psychology; on the 
other hand it would mean to take seriously those ‘perplexed authors’ (researchers and 
practitioners) in order to rally them around the constitutive doubts they continuously 
encounter within their practices. This could open up ‘inventive’ spaces for thought around 
the complex and often polarised issues surrounding child witness practice and child 
protection more generally. 
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With this outlook my project follows in the spirit of those who have in various ways 
highlighted the timeliness of suggestibility, demanding for us to take seriously the questions 
suggestibility allows us to ask (cf. Chertok & Stengers 1992, Despret 2004), and those 
questions, I would add, suggestibility asks us. 
  
Notes: 
1 Stenner (2007) draws on the work of process philosophers such as Whitehead and 
Bergson to argue for the need to develop what he calls a relational and process 
centred ontology for psychology. Criticising the formulaic anti-scientism of some 
critical approaches in psychology, he argues that a process centred approach could 
allow for a profound version of constructivism which does not reduce the universe 
to ‘discourse’ or ‘subjective meaning’, and a deepened empiricism which does not 
reduce nature to meaningless materiality. Working on the basis of a process centred 
ontology means to grasp the world as constituted through a continuous succession 
of instantaneous configurations of matter. Here mind, self and matter are not seen as 
separate ‘states’ or ‘substances’, but are equally considered to be founded in ongoing 
processes and practices of relating (see also Brown & Stenner 2009).  
2 Judge2: 788-807. The data quoted in this article was collected in 2004 by the author 
as part of a larger research project comparing child witness practice in England and 
Germany (Motzkau 2006). 
3 Judge2: 945-951 
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